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Murray K. Simpson 
University of Dundee, UK 
Disability, Gender, and Innocence: Russ Meyer’s Mudhoney and Faster 
Pussycat! Kill! Kill! and Problems of Signification in Cinema 
As Slavoj Žižek observed, the interpretation of film must be approached “in the way one has 
to interpret a Chinese political poem: absences and surprising presences count” (125). The 
same is true of the “deviant” body and for the body out of place. Disability weaves its way 
through cinema and culture in multifarious, and often unexpected, forms. There have been 
various efforts to theorize disability and cinema – though, immediately, we must distinguish 
between theorizing disability in cinema and an attempt to produce a more general theory of 
disability and cinema. For the most part, these efforts have come from disability studies, 
rather than cinema studies, gender studies, semiotics, or sociology, although these areas of 
study inform them to greater or lesser degrees.  
This chapter will look at the narrative construction and deployment of three characters 
with disabilities from two films by exploitation moviemaker Russ Meyer: Mudhoney (1965) 
and Faster Pussycat! Kill! Kill! (1966), in order to explore the various ways in which 
different impairments link with gender, sexuality, and moral culpability, avoiding a simplistic 
assessment of these representations as one-dimensional, and revealing their complex semiotic 
structure. The ultimate purpose of this is to consider the vexed question of signification and 
the body, particularly the disabled body, building on the seminal contribution by David T. 
Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder of the concept of “narrative prosthesis” (Narrative Prosthesis 
15), which has already been addressed in the chapter written by Dan Goodley and Marek 
Mackiewicz. This article takes disability studies as its starting point, though its purpose is not 
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to produce or contribute to a general theory of disability in cinema, but to critique monolithic 
approaches. The key contribution of the chapter is to demonstrate, through the application of 
basic elements of semiotics, that it is rarely meaningful or useful to consider characters with 
specific body differences as “representing” disability. In other words, the chapter will 
demonstrate that abnormal bodies rarely, if ever, signify disability as an entire category or 
paradigm. Also, it will highlight the paradox of considering corporeal difference as 
representing abstract concepts whilst simultaneously taking those very concepts as signifiers 
of that non-standard embodiment. Of course, within a complex economy of signs it is likely 
that all elements will perform multiple functions as signifying and signified components. 
However, it is precisely this infinitely mutually sustaining nature of language that highlights 
the impossibility of a meaningful, yet entirely self-contained, sign. By assuming a broadly 
post-Saussurean semiotic approach based on a dyadic,1 complex, and arbitrary model of signs 
(cf. Deely), the analysis will show that bodily difference itself generally performs the 
function of signifier, and that the interplay of disability, gender, and age in the signification 
of moral coding, highlights the error of privileging any one corporeal dimension as a 
narrative signifier. 
At this point, it is worth making a few comments on the theoretical orientation of the 
chapter. First, the study considers the “overdetermination” of corporeal signification, wherein 
a wide range of semi-autonomous factors, none of which is uniquely causal or essential, 
contribute to the production of signs. This avoids reductive approaches to the films’ symbolic 
systems focused on any single dimension, or regarding them separately – deformed, deviant 
and hypersexualized bodies, as well as cars, music, and dusty landscapes all play a part, and 
even the emphasis in this chapter on corporeal signs is driven purely by present interest and 
not because they are discrete. Overdetermination is understood in two distinct ways in 
 
1 Semiotics involves the division of signs into two, sometimes three, component parts. In the dyadic model, 
taken here, a sign can be theoretically divided into a ‘signifier’ – a written or spoken word, a symbol, a picture – 





semiotics. Firstly, there is the overdetermination of the sign itself and its existence qua sign, 
that is to say, the production of a sign through the repetition of a range of symbolic and non-
symbolic factors results in a signifier capable of sustaining a signified concept such that the 
sign can be used in symbolic exchange. Floyd Merrell locates this understanding of 
overdetermination in Peircean semiotics, identifying it with the very earliest stage of sign 
formation: a “pre-Firstness, [or] pure vagueness, before there is consciousness of a sign” (35). 
For Merrell, then, overdetermination refers to a stage before intersecting flows, marks, and 
exclusions achieve the degree of stability necessary for meaningful signs to emerge. The 
formation of signs is perhaps more akin to a primordial evolution from a range of random and 
arbitrary conditions than it is to a clear and restricted causal determination by those 
conditions. For the purposes of this analysis, then, “overdetermination” is taken more in a 
Freudian-inspired sense to refer to the accomplishment of signs through the repetition of 
multiple and varied linguistic and non-linguistic moments, avoiding recourse to accounts of 
causality completely. The second consideration, then, is implicit in the first, and that is to 
understand the functioning of signs themselves as factors in the overdetermination of other 
signs and practices. To put it simply, all signs affect the production and meaning of other 
signs within the same context. Understanding the semiotics of the films, therefore, demands 
attention to the relationality of signs and their interplay within and beyond symbolic systems. 
The analysis of disability in the two films considered here must also attend to gender, the 
mise-en-scène, the revving of car engines and of libidos, since everything contributes to the 
films’ overall excessive symbolic economies. However, the cinematic audience must be 
culturally and linguistically pre-prepared for the signs, if not their precise arrangement, 
before the films even begin if they are not to be overwhelmed by the production of new signs. 





the films recapitulate the production of familiar signs, and the second is to analyze how the 
films’ corporeal signs contribute to overdetermination. 
This approach contrasts sharply with the dominant emphasis on representation, as 
opposed to signification, in the study of disability and cinema. Most commonly there are 
interrogations of how film and other cultural media use disability as a physical or narrative 
representation of moral concepts, with the implication that this morality, in turn, becomes 
socially definitive for disabled people. Benjamin Fraser’s recent collection on Cultures of 
Representation: Disability in World Cinema is a case in point, with none of the chapters 
adopting a semiotic approach. 
In the case of director, Russ Meyer, best known for his work in “exploitation” cinema, 
although an undoubted auteur and innovator, the corporeal emphasis for which he is most 
commonly remembered is his highly sexist use of pneumatic female actors. His films were 
generally low budget and, whilst aimed at the grindhouse market, have become cult classics 
in many cases. There have been a number of studies of his films, although there has not been 
any real exploration of his portrayal of characters with disabilities, and this is precisely where 
the focus of this chapter is directed. These portrayals rely heavily, if implicitly, on social 
normativity in order to produce fantastical, queered landscapes of grotesques and bizarre 
beings. As Susan Flynn observes, 
Hollywood celebrates normativity as the oil that greases the wheels of 
progress and thus utilises difference as a narrative tool. The body is used as 
the terrain on which the battle for power and autonomy is fought. Films replete 
with the threat of danger take us on a journey of cinematic escapism, which 





The relevance of cinematic presentations of impaired and deviant bodies is, therefore, of 
central importance, not merely for disabled people, but for all. Film contributes to the 
biopolitical governance of human life, and, as a result, becomes a site of resistance to it. 
 
Eula  
The first character the chapter will discuss is that of Eula, played by Rena Horten, who 
appears in Mudhoney, released in 1965. Set in Prohibition-era Missouri, the story takes place 
in the small town of Spooner through which the film’s protagonist, Calif McKinney (John 
Furlong), is travelling en route to California, carrying a secret from his past, namely that he 
accidentally killed a strike-breaker in a fight. Instead, he finds love in the arms of the wife of 
the film’s villain, Sidney Brenshaw (played superbly by Hal Hopper). 
Eula is the deaf-mute2 sister of Clara Belle (Lorna Maitland), and daughter of Maggie 
Marie (Princess Livingston), who runs a brothel and drinking den in which the two daughters 
are apparently the only prostitutes. What makes Eula most interesting is that she is seemingly 
completely unaware of the social world around her – the context, morality, and implications 
of what she does. Moral dissipation and turpitude surrounds Eula, whilst she remains 
innocent throughout.  
Though much of the depravity centers on, or is in keeping with, her own sexually 
promiscuous behavior, Eula is protected from its significance because she is presented as 
lacking in the comprehension of language. She hears and speaks no evil, and that which she 
sees she is unable to recognize as such. Language is presented as the medium necessary for 
the transformation of amoral natural proclivities into social acts, capable of being judged 
against moral codes. If Eula can read, we have no clue about this, and it would seem 
disruptive of the moral texture of the narrative if she could. She is a child of nature – a fact 
 





signified at several points by her play with a kitten – physically present in the social world, 
but simultaneously absent from it because she is outside of the linguistic community.  
Nowhere is Eula’s pre-linguistic state of moral purity made clearer than when the 
film’s protagonist, Calif McKinney goes to visit Maggie Marie’s house. In the scene, we find 
Calif drinking homemade spirits. Touching the record player beside him, Eula is sensing the 
vibrations of a Strauss waltz through her fingers, standing in a state of ecstatic reverie with 
her eyes closed – further focusing her senses on touch. Calif seems captivated by her. Though 
it is not Eula he loves – Calif has already fallen for Brenshaw’s wife, Hannah (Antoinette 
Cristiani) – he is transported by her appearance. Calif takes Eula’s hand and holds it to his 
throat whilst he hums the waltz himself. She smiles, feeling the vibrations. Somewhat drunk, 
he then dances with her around the room, an expansive and energetic waltz, before collapsing 
backwards through the bead-string door and onto her bed laughing. Eula pauses at the door, 
halfway through the strings of beads, which hang around her face and neck, before following 
him. She begins to undress Calif, before taking off her own dress and standing before him 
naked, completely lacking in self-consciousness, which the camera captures from Calif’s 
perspective. Eula is unembarrassed by the spectator, which is to say the audience who occupy 
Calif’s position. The vulgar intrusion of Brenshaw then interrupts the scene.  
The dance itself is a curious spectacle. Whatley notes that, “A condition of ‘otherness’ 
associated with disabled people tends to be emphasized by pairing disabled with nondisabled 
dancers” (50). However, as the music continues and the dancers move around the room, we 
forget that Eula is neither hearing the music, nor picking up its vibrations. For that moment, 
the scene effectively normalizes Eula for the audience. 
As the scene moves from the public room to the bedroom, Calif’s disposition changes 
in a way we would perhaps expect. Moving from his initial captivation, his happiness 





anticipation captured in close-up, and, finally, to embarrassment and anger towards his 
tormentor, Brenshaw, which is again highlighted in a facial close-up. For Eula, however, the 
scene plays very differently. Whilst, again, she fails to register Brenshaw’s malevolent 
derision, mainly directed at Calif, the more interesting aspect is the way in which, for her, the 
movement of the scene, from her initial euphoria to the bedroom scene, is almost completely 
seamless. Eula does not move, as Calif does, from a higher state of joy to a baser plane of 
animal desire and then anger. For her, it is all one, a continuous state of serene happiness, 
interrupted only by surprise at the intrusion of Brenshaw – for whom she does, curiously, 
cover her breasts, though not her pubic area. The bead curtain door, which is all that separates 
the public room from her bedroom, also highlights this continuity. The divisions of visibility 
that generally mark the social world do not exist for Eula, since they rest on knowledge of 
privacy and shame, and Eula knows neither.  
Eula finally has her innocence and, as a telling marker, her silence, shattered at the 
end of the film. Confirming her status as a child of nature, Eula, again playing with the kitten, 
somehow senses violence unfolding in the town, though she can neither see nor hear it, as the 
lynch-mob closes in on the increasingly desperate and mad Brenshaw. Running to the scene, 
her lack of comprehension of human violence and brutality is brought to an abrupt end with 
the sight of the preacher, Brother Hansen (Frank Bolger), kicking a barrel from beneath the 
feet of the noosed Brenshaw. The sight of the hanged Brenshaw requires no linguistic 
intercession to make her aware of the viciousness of the townspeople. She utters her only 
sound as the film closes around her scream. 
Eula’s deafness isolates her from the moral corruption that immerses her. Her 
sexuality is an active one, which is conspicuous in the fact that she follows, without 
inhibition, her natural proclivities and desires, also she is very assertive in approaching men 





to receive, however willingly, aggressive male sexuality. A reversal almost happens in Faster 
Pussycat! with the case of a male character with intellectual disability, where seduction is 
attempted by a sexually aggressive woman. However, this cannot come to fruition precisely 
because, ultimately, he fails in his manhood. 
Despite her amorality, or, rather, because of it, Eula’s body is even more publically 
displayed than her sister’s is. Her bra-less cleavage reaching almost to the navel is constantly 
on display, except when she is completely naked. Even when showering outside, Eula only 
smiles at the arrival of the leering Brenshaw and the apocalyptic puritan, Brother Hansen, 
making no effort to cover her nudity. Lacking the language to formulate the basis for 
embarrassment herself, the viewer is to understand that Eula is unable to comprehend either 
Brenshaw’s odious lust, or Hansen’s hypocritical seething moral condemnation. Whilst Eula 
is undoubtedly presented as the Other, it would be too simplistic to call it an “inferiority” and 
there is no obvious narrative desire to restore “an originary wholeness [or] to institute a 
notion of the body within a regime of tolerable deviance” (Mitchell and Snyder, Narrative 
Prosthesis 6-7). Instead, her body as signifier is much more complex, with gender, beauty, 
sensuality, deafness and so forth, all contributing to its overdetermination,, as we shall see 
below. 
 
The Old Man and the Vegetable  
The other two characters appear in Meyer’s next, and arguably best (McDonough 175-76; 
Waters 42), film, Faster Pussycat! Kill! Kill!, released in 1966. The film, which has become 
something of a post-feminist cultural icon, centers on the rampaging exploits of three go-go 
dancers, led by the curvaceous and deadly Varla (Tura Satana). Having kidnapped a young 
socialite, Linda (Susan Bernard), after dispatching her insipid boyfriend, the trio wind up on a 





(Stuart Lancaster, who also appeared in Mudhoney and numerous other Meyer movies) and 
his two sons, Kirk (Paul Trinka), the elder son, and his younger son, known only as “the 
Vegetable” (Dennis Busch). 
We get our first proper introduction to both the Vegetable and the Old Man as they sit 
at the kitchen table. Like Eula, the Vegetable is playing with a kitten when we first meet him. 
The scene emphasizes both his musculature and gentleness. He is redolent of Frankenstein’s 
monster in his play, and the spectacle balances on the cusp of horror in the stark contrast 
between his gentle play and his muscular frame, which could crush the kitten in an instant. 
The Old Man injects sufficient menace into the proceedings to make the viewer consider that 
as a serious possibility. 
The Vegetable has some kind of intellectual disability, which ultimately is the source 
of his innocence, but, unlike Eula, he has some degree of knowledge of right and wrong – 
though not enough for autonomous moral existence. His pliability and knowledge, albeit 
conflicted, of his wrongdoing in the brutalization of young women at his father’s behest lead 
ultimately to a redemption that demands a trade with his freedom, as Kirk lovingly assures 
him of institutional care. Language as a mark of moral culpability also features for the 
Vegetable. For the most part, he says little and when he does, his words falter. 
Entirely different to Eula, the Vegetable seems almost asexual, despite being a model 
of masculine physical perfection. When Varla and Rosie (Haji), another gang member and 
Varla’s lover, strike provocative poses, the Vegetable munches unconcernedly on an apple, 
awaiting his next instructions from the Old Man. Later, as Billie (Lori Williams), the third of 
the Amazonian outlaws, tries to seduce him, he seems more intent on his weight training, 
almost uncomprehending of Billie’s intentions. In both psychophysiological and Butlerian 





24). The Vegetable has no existence other than as a functional extension of his father and an 
object of Billie’s lust until the film’s final scenes. 
The Old Man is a wheelchair user, with a violent unyielding misogyny fueling his 
psyche following an incident in which he acquired his impairment helping a young woman to 
board a moving train. The film makes various allusions to the Old Man, aided by the 
Vegetable, inflicting sexual violence on young women. As the Old Man says, “When you 
hurt somebody the authorities get aroused. But what do they know about hurting and pain? 
We’re payin’ ‘em back, boy. Each woman, a payment.” The Old Man has a contradictory 
relationship towards the Vegetable. On the one hand, he is completely dependent upon him 
for all his physical needs, including the acquisition of women. At the same time, he loathes 
and resents him, not only for his dependence upon him, but because his wife died giving birth 
to him. Though never to his face, the Old Man is open to others about the contempt he has for 
his younger son, “a blob of flesh.” 
We see the Old Man’s raging madness finally boiling over as the Vegetable gives 
chase to the escaping Linda. The Old Man clambers out of the truck and starts dragging 
himself towards the low angled static camera, and to where the Vegetable has caught up with 
the screaming victim. The Old Man is simultaneously powerful in his violence, and his ability 
to exercise it through his son, and emasculated and pathetic, heaving himself through the dust 
towards his prey, against whom he would be completely ineffectual on his own. Central to his 
character throughout the movie is his impaired sense of agency, which is limited by his 
dependence on others, a point that Tom Shakespeare believes to be common to disabled 
characters in cinema (58-69). The landscape through which he crawls is as barren, fruitless, 
and terrifying as he is. As he steadily bears down on the camera, and thus the audience, he 
shouts maniacally to his son, egging him on: 





C’mon boy, we know what to do now, just like before. 
That’s it boy. We got her now. 
Go on boy, get her, get her! 
Don’t let her scream, and get something in her mouth. Hit her head, boy. Tell 
her yer daddy is paid, boy. 
In his moment of need, the repudiation of his son vanishes. The Old Man is completely 
dependent on the Vegetable to form a fully functioning, sexually violent unit. 
By this point, Linda has capitulated. With the camera alternating between the 
Vegetable’s perspective above her – showing the tired and pained resignation in her face – to 
low camera shots from behind Linda and the Vegetable’s menacing frame hulking towards 
her, Linda says: “Go ahead. I don’t care. Get it over with. Just leave me alone. Leave me 
alone.” It is at this point that the Vegetable finally breaks down and some innate sense of 
right and wrong takes over, superseding the authority and instructions of the Old Man. 
Covering his face with his fists, he begins to cry, then, dropping to his knees and putting his 
hands then head on Linda’s thigh just as Kirk arrives: 
The Vegetable: I can’t do it. 
 I… I… I… I don’t mean to 
 I’m… sorry  
Kirk: Easy brother, everything’s going to be alright. 
 You’re doing fine, you’re doing just fine.  
The Vegetable: I’m sorry 
 you… believe me? 
 I… don’t know. 
 nothing… right 





Kirk: You’re going to be alright. 
The co-dependence between the Old Man and the Vegetable is irreparably broken. The Old 
Man looks on disgusted, still lying in the desert sand. 
The shifting of the camera perspective from behind Linda, looking up at the 
Vegetable, to the Vegetable’s perspective looking down directly mirrors that of Eula and 
Calif in the bedroom. However, where the Vegetable’s intellectual disability and masculine 
body create a terrifying sexual menace, Eula’s deafness and feminine form produce a 
powerful allure. Linda surrenders, resigned to her defeat, and Calif surrenders willingly to 
Eula’s charms. Only by introducing a pathological female hypersexuality, in the form of 
Varla and company, does Meyer encourage the audience to contemplate a reversal of the 
gender roles in the first scenario. A reversal in the second would be virtually impossible. 
 
Im/moral bodies 
For the Vegetable, then, his intellectual disability diminishes his moral culpability, but 
although, like Eula, he is unable to formulate moral precepts, he demonstrates an innate sense 
of right and wrong at the end. Unlike Eula, however, he is forced to recognize the wrongness 
of his own actions, and he is required to perform various redemptive acts: demonstrating 
sorrow, killing Rosie (whom he appears to blame for the death of Billie), battling Varla, and 
accepting institutionalization. 
Impairments aside, whilst both the Vegetable and Eula embody, and are presented as, 
ideals of masculine and feminine bodily perfection, the Vegetable remains sexually 
emasculated. Although Billie’s charms begin to take some effect on him, he ultimately lacks 
the requisite male aggression to give Billie the sex she desires, whereas Eula merely has to 
receive the sexual advances of men. Instead, the Vegetable allows the maddening sound of a 





as he is yielding to Billie’s seduction, which is also one of the clearest signs that all of his 
violence is rooted in his unquestioning obedience to his father (cf. Mollow 286).  
The Old Man is a more hackneyed symbol of moral decay. He has all of the carnal 
aggression that the Vegetable lacks, coupled with a deep-seated lust for violent revenge 
against women, and, in this respect, he embodies what Shakespeare refers to as the cultural 
linkage of “sexuality with disability, and sexuality with mortality” (59). It is of no 
consequence that his body became impaired during an act of helping; he is the architect of his 
own inescapable judgment. Although thoroughly rooted in his impairment, the Old Man has 
chosen a life of hatred: to hold all women responsible for what happened to him, to blame his 
younger son for his wife’s death, and to use him as an instrument for his malevolent designs.  
Of the three, only the Old Man and, as a signifier, his broken body, are presented as 
morally and physically repellent. The hidden nature of Eula’s and the Vegetable’s 
impairments mean that their externally “normal” bodies can still conform to dominant 
aesthetic ideals of human beauty, and also highlight the linkage between physical and moral 
goodness – though more akin to amoral ‘noble savages’ than the ‘civilized’ goodness 
discussed by Goodley and Mackiewicz below. In the bedroom scene with Eula and Calif, 
both Calif and the audience are invited to share in the spectacle of Eula’s naked body. We can 
see in Calif what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls the “visual magnetism of breasts [which] 
can make both starers and starees anxious” (143). He experiences the delicious erotic anxiety 
at the prospect of what is about to happen. Again, however, Eula has no such experience 
because her eroticism has an entirely different register. There is, however, an implicit 
devaluing of Eula, in that she is unwittingly a siren around whose rocks the moral wreckage 
of men floats. Calif is a free man, and, whilst the audience are not exactly enjoined to 
condemn his moment of desire for Eula, we have sympathy for his love of Brenshaw’s wife 





lust for Eula, whilst she has pure erotic desires for them, free from the moral disapprobation 
implied by “lust.” Conversely, whilst it is not possible for others to love Eula, neither can she 
truly give love, condemned as she is, by her deafness, to a series of sexual couplings that 
cannot provide the symbolic depth necessary for a truly loving relationship. For Eula, only 
the viewer can (choose to) see her social oppression; she herself lacks the conceptual 
apparatus, and neither does she enjoy any aesthetic sensibility beyond that which gratifies 
her.3 
 
Disability and the problem of representation 
Mitchell and Snyder’s work provides a clear starting point for the analysis of signification in 
the two films: 
Our thesis centers not simply upon the fact that people with disabilities have 
been the object of representational treatments, but rather that their function in 
literary discourse is primarily twofold: disability pervades literary narrative, 
first, as a stock feature of characterization and, second, as an opportunistic 
metaphorical device. (Narrative Prosthesis 47)  
This leads them to assert the near ubiquity of disability in cinema and literature, on which 
they base their theory of “narrative prosthesis.” One of the key aspects of the approach, 
evident here, is that the issues of oppression and resistance lie primarily in the textual 
reading, which always offers multiple possibilities, rather than in taking fixed positions about 
the nature of the texts themselves. In other words, the act of reading any text, as well as 
producing it, can create an act of resistance, though neither resistance nor oppression is ever 
fully complete. Thus, Michael T. Clarke’s objection that even documentary cinema made by 
disabled film makers and giving direct voice to disabled people can be corrupted by the 
 
3 In similar vein, Jessica Berson comments on the way in which the casting of Deaf actors in female 
Shakespearean roles, metaphorically representing concepts and dramatic relations, has the (unintended) effect of 





internalization of ableist cinematic conventions, thereby undermining Snyder and Mitchell’s 
position, seems to miss the point. The potential for texts to provide opportunities for the 
opening of new spaces for resistance to imposed subjectivities is still compatible with the 
continued existence of oppressive tendencies in those same texts. In fact, both continually 
weave themselves through texts. Narrative prosthesis, then, is as much a committed practice 
of critical engagement as it is a theory of how disability functions in literary and cinematic 
texts. 
Elsewhere, Mitchell and Snyder give a useful typology, chronologically traced, of 
approaches to theorizing cultural representations of disability: early efforts, focused on 
“negative imagery;” “social realist;” a more critical “new historicist” approach, and 
“biographical criticism” (“Representation and its Discontents” 196, 199, 201, 205). However, 
there is a problem with how representation itself is being used, pointing two ways. Mitchell 
and Snyder outline what they regard as the three most commonly identified stereotypes of 
disability – Melville’s Captain Ahab, Dickens’ Tiny Tim, and Shakespeare’s Richard III – 
which are used to critique the way in which disability is represented in literature. However, 
confusion arises because actually none of these characters represents disability. What they 
represent are moral concepts: hubris, pathos, and iniquity. To become confused on this point 
means pressing disability into double-facing service in relation to signification; the signifier 
is the specific impairment, or other bodily difference, that which is being signified is the, 
usually moral, concept it operates to denote. That which is signified cannot, therefore, 
function simultaneously as a signifier for the impairment. 
In the case of Eula, her deafness is used to signify her natural state of amorality. It 
does not, however, follow that ingenuousness can serve to represent deafness, and nor is there 
any evidence that naivety is being equated with sensory impairments. Similarly, taking the 





malevolence, and his vengeful hatred. Again, however, there are problems in expecting the 
various elements of the sign to function simultaneously as both signifier and signified. The 
Vegetable’s intellectual disability is a different kind of marker to Eula’s for innocence, but, 
nonetheless, innocence cannot by virtue of this sign come to signify intellectual disability, a 
point that would be true on either a Saussurean dyadic model, or a Peircean triadic model of 
the sign (Deely passim). 
We can see a clear example of this in an early exchange between Varla and the Old 
Man. As they confront each other in a dialogue, the camera position switches from behind 
Varla, foregrounding her curvaceous hips and derriere, as the Old Man talks, and a view that 
foregrounds a rear-shot of his wheelchair when Varla is the interlocutor. In a visual 
synecdoche, the Old Man talks to Varla’s hips and thighs as the literal embodiment of female 
sexuality, whilst Varla talks to the Old Man’s wheelchair, which carries his derelict body and 
turns out to be the location of the hidden money, as the symbol of his depraved character. 
But, whilst Varla’s behind signifies a wanton sexuality and the partial view of the Old Man’s 
body and wheelchair signifies his moral corruption, those signified concepts cannot be 
reversed to infer those particular signifiers. The concept of dangerous femininity is not linked 
essentially or uniquely to the image of a woman’s behind and nor is moral turpitude 
exhaustively and inextricably linked to wheelchair use. 
However, this is a rather different point to the observation of Mitzi Walz in relation to 
the “looping effect” (103), in which negative, principally medical, “representations” of 
disability become culturally propagated, only to be internalized by disabled people 
themselves and reproduced in their own narratives. This looping sequence, if indeed it can be 
said to exist in any substantial way, does not involve self-referential signs. Furthermore, in 
any system of signs, multiple loops could always be found that would bring the signified back 





model of looping implies a high level of passivity on the part of spectator, disabled or 
otherwise, and a high degree of consistency and stability in the meaning of signs and 
economy of semiotic elements in order to produce this self-perpetuating looping effect.  
Mitchell and Snyder discuss disability in relation to its function as “a linguistic 
‘signifier’” (“Representation and its Discontents” 214). However, firstly, disability per se is 
almost never a signifier, that is, as a general concept or social category, only specific 
characters and precise bodily differences. Moreover, in such instances, when a particular 
impairment or difference exists as a signifier, “disability” is rarely the concept signified. 
When it is the concept of “disability” that is signified, something else must act as the 
signifier. The question in those events is: What is representing disability? Rather than the 
reverse: What is disability representing? “Disability,” in other words, does not represent 
anything, because other than as a word – written or spoken – or probably the only other 
example, the universally recognized, if problematic, wheelchair logo, the entirety of 
“disability” cannot be presented in a single character or situation. Signifiers are restricted to 
each unique instance of corporeal variance: Eula’s deafness, the Vegetable’s intellectual 
disability, or the Old Man’s paraplegia, each of which signifies very different concepts, none 
of which could be interchangeable and all of which are variable even in other literary 
characters with similar impairments – highlighting the basic semiotic premise of the 
arbitrariness of the sign, i.e. the lack of a natural link between the signifier and the signified. 
The exact operations of signification become lost amidst less precise references to 
“representation.” Kate Ellis renders an even more crude approach, suggesting that, “An 
influential social barrier for people with impairments is the representation of disability in 
films because cinema is a powerful cultural tool in shaping society’s opinion of disability” 
(2). However, as noted, no single disabled character, such as Eula, can be said to represent 





concepts, of which her deafness forms only one part of the signifier, along with her 
voluptuous female body; open and active sexuality; and her plunging cleavage, when she is 
dressed at all. In other words, this presents us with a corporeal nexus of signification, in 
which disability, gender, race, and sexuality are all merely dimensions. 
In fact, there is a prevalence of this kind of disordered analysis of signs in most of the 
literature, largely stemming from an initial focus on disability, coupled with a poorly 
theorized understanding of representation and signification. Angela Smith, for example, also 
illustrates the typical difficulties with this approach when she suggests that 
The narrative and metaphoric construction of disability in classical myth, 
folklore, and literature has invested certain impairments with particular 
symbolic meanings. Blindness, for instance, often figures an absolute 
helplessness or dependency. . . . Alternatively, blindness indicates, or is 
compensated with, inner sight and wisdom. (83) 
Again, the arbitrariness, and plurality, of the sign is evident, as is the impossibility of 
inverting the sign to make dependency or inner sight signifiers for blindness. The meanings 
are being invested with “reduced” bodies, rather than the reverse. 
We also need to consider whether the ways in which impaired and abnormal bodies 
perform signifying functions in essentially different ways to other bodies. In Faster 
Pussycat!, for example, danger does not come only from the two disabled characters; indeed, 
the most dangerous individuals are Varla and her two accomplices. As the opening (moral) 
narrator says, 
While violence cloaks itself in a plethora of disguises, its favorite mantle still 
remains . . . sex. Violence devours all it touches, its voracious appetite rarely 
fulfilled. . . . Let’s examine closely that most dangerously evil creation, this 





softness is there, the unmistakable smell of female, the surface shiny and 
silken, the body yielding yet wanton. 
Immediately, without even seeing any flesh, the primacy of the female body as a surface for 
the eruption of sexual violence is established. The first scene shows the three go-go dancers 
at work in a nightclub, leering men egging them on; they are the first victims of ruinous 
feminine power. The ostensibly unimpaired bodies of the three outlaw women function as 
sites of signification as much as any of the three disabled characters considered here – a 
surface for the inscription of wanton lust and the murderous consequences of an assertive 
female sexuality. Similarly, Clara Belle, Eula’s sister, is thoroughly aware of, and an active 
participant in, the monetary sale of her voluptuous body. This certainly shifts her moral 
status, but her body is no less involved in a signifying relationship with the moral concepts 
that it signifies than Eula’s is. In the case of most of Meyer’s women, and many of the men, 
corporeal difference not constituting disability functions in signification in precisely the same 
way, if for other concepts, as do abnormal bodies. The bodies of Varla and her band may be 
extreme, but they are by no means even abnormal, let alone impaired. This suggests that the 
recognition of the importance of the body as a site of cultural signification cannot privilege 
any one dimension such as disability, as Snyder and Mitchell do in claiming that, “Body 




The deployment of impaired and otherwise aberrant bodies in the two films discussed creates 
a tense interplay of semiotic elements. The primary signifying functions in both are 
performed by corporeality. However, they evince multiple and shifting relations to the moral 





corporeality itself to become the signified element. This is certainly not to suggest that body 
concepts cannot be signified, merely that such signification cannot be assumed to be present 
in every case of bodily difference, and must be established specifically. 
Grindhouse cinema always had an ambiguous and contradictory relationship towards 
its own narratives and characters (Mathijs and Sexton 97). The nature of exploitation cinema 
was such that it had to be seen to condemn the very thing that it sold. This was a consistent 
theme since the early days of the morality films from the pre- and post-War period, such as 
Reefer Madness (dir. Louis J. Gasnier, 1936), Sex Madness (dir. Dwain Esper, 1938), or Test 
Tube Babies (dir. W. Merle Connell, 1948). The original title for Mudhoney was Rope of 
Flesh, a reference to the origins of Brenshaw’s demise in his own carnality. Condemnation 
and denigration of wildly deviant characters, therefore, is not a straightforward matter. In this 
respect, grindhouse presents an ideal vehicle for the study of complex signification and 
corporeal deviance. It fetishizes bodily and behavioral deviance such that normalcy is safely 
circumvented before being ultimately assured. 
The problem of theorizing bodily signification in cinema becomes even more 
pronounced in relation to the “fantastical” body, particularly in the horror and super-hero 
genres. These comprise, on the one hand, the preternatural body – vampires, werewolves, 
zombies, angels, and so forth – and, on the other, the hyper-endowed, super-body – whether 
hero or villain. The latter category is slightly more complex insofar as, first, many such 
characters, such as Daredevil or Professor X, have bodies that would conventionally be 
considered ‘impaired’ – and, second, the distinction between technologically enhanced cyber-
bodies – Robocop, Iron Man – and the physically altered or different, those who have or 
acquire superhuman powers – Spiderman, Superman, the Hulk – is difficult, and perhaps 
impossible to draw. However, neither the preternatural nor super-body is routinely 





with the very notable exception of the analyses which Angela Smith offers in her book. This 
problem is usually evinced in the opposite direction where general cinematic studies of the 
fantastical body are invariably impoverished in relation to any demonstrable awareness and 
use of insights from disability studies.4 The various offerings on the narrative of Frankenstein 
are almost the only regular point of mutual contact.  
In spite of this, we do not have to look far in order to see the potential for fruitful 
crossover. In a review of Paul Verhoeven’s Robocop, Julie Codell observes, 
Robocop’s body is the nexus of hi-tech production and of consumerism as an 
end-in-itself. His body focuses a wide range of literal and metaphoric body 
imagery, expanding into the total corpus: the human body, the corporate body, 
the body politic, the social body.  
Although the character of Murphy, and his monstrous incarnation as Robocop, rest on his 
massively impaired, not to say, dead, body, Codell’s comment points to the possibility of an 
elaborated view of narrative prosthesis. Firstly, however, any such approach would not favor 
any one dimension of corporeality over any other. Secondly, it would incorporate a more 
semiotically informed approach, in which bodily difference is much more commonly a 
signifying than signified element. Thirdly, such an approach would recognize in its symbolic 
analyses the theoretical identity of putatively “real” abnormality, as well as the fantastical and 
monstrous. Fourthly, it would avoid the generalizing temptation to produce theories that take 
as their premise the assumption that all instances of portrayed bodily difference would fit a 
single pattern. And, fifthly, it would anticipate the overdetermination of signified elements. 
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